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Abstract: Traditional channel irrigation systems in Switzerland are managed on a 
community basis and have high cultural, touristic and ecological values. However, many 
irrigation communities disappeared in the last decades. This paper analyzes the factors 
contributing to the continuation of a still existent irrigation community. Our analysis thus 
provides insights into how to avoid further losses of these unique agricultural systems and 
to preserve the associated benefits. Based on hypotheses derived from game theoretical 
analysis, a survey was conducted in an irrigation community located in the canton of 
Valais. Our results show that the motivation of community members to remain in the 
traditional system is not a financial one. In contrast, factors such as long-term perspectives, 
system knowledge, communication and the institutional setting seem to be the basis for the 
continuation of the analyzed irrigation community. For policy makers, this example shows 
that the creation of institutions that enable self-governance, communication and knowledge 
transfer should be considered in this field of rural and agricultural policy making. 
Keywords: traditional irrigation systems; water channels; community based management; 
Valais; Switzerland 
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1. Introduction 
Irrigation is an important determinant of agricultural production and rural land use in many parts of 
the world (see, e.g., [1–3] for overviews). Despite the technological and institutional development in 
irrigation systems in modern agriculture, traditional (indigenous) irrigation systems are still important 
in developing and developed countries. Following Trawick [4], the term traditional (indigenous) 
irrigation system refers to small-scaled channel systems, built by local people, with water use carried 
out following long term traditions. These systems are usually community based (often implying  
self-governance), i.e., farmers organize infrastructure and resource use on their own (e.g., [5,6]). The 
institutional design of agricultural water use is (and will be in the future) of highest importance to 
ensure sustainable water resource use and sufficient food production. Therefore, these traditional 
irrigation systems have received special attention, because they represent examples where sustainable 
water resource use has been ensured over centuries (e.g. [4,7–9]).  
A wide range of studies has addressed the social, cultural and economic factors underlying the 
existence and stability of cooperative management systems (see, e.g., [10–15] for discussions and 
overviews). In the economic literature, the cooperative management of such irrigation systems has 
been recognized as an example for the management of a common pool resource (see [16] for 
overviews). In the case of an irrigation system, the common pool resource may be water itself (e.g., for 
a water reservoir), the joint provision of irrigation infrastructure or both. From a game-theoretical point 
of view, this cooperative infrastructure provision and maintenance could lead to situations of a 
prisoner’s dilemma (e.g., [17,18]). However, many real-world examples show that the cooperative 
management of irrigation systems is, despite the theoretical dilemma, possible (e.g., [4,16]). This 
observation has induced a wide range of theoretical and empirical investigations to reveal factors that 
enable cooperation in such community based use of common pool resources (see, e.g., [16,19–21]  
for overviews).  
Our paper addresses the case of traditional channel irrigation systems in the Valais (a Swiss canton 
located in the southwest of the country), which are managed on a community basis. These irrigation 
systems are necessary to conduct mountain agriculture in this part of Switzerland. However, the 
economic relevance of these irrigation systems was significantly reduced in the last decades, and many 
irrigation communities thus disappeared. This development caused societal welfare reductions, 
because these traditional irrigation systems provide important services to the society by having high 
cultural, touristic and ecological importance (details are presented in section 3). Furthermore, 
irreversibility properties of abandoning irrigation due to failures of community based approaches in 
these mountainous regions can cause economic losses. In absence of irrigated grassland production, 
natural regrowth (e.g., by shrubs) will cause losses of production sites. Furthermore, infrastructure, 
such as water channels, is rapidly lost if not maintained (see, e.g., [22]). Once lost, the costs of  
re-establishing grassland sites (e.g., in cases where there would be higher needs for food production) or 
the re-construction of infrastructure, such as water channels, can be very high. For instance, Zurwerra [23] 
estimates the costs that are necessary to re-construct the currently existing system of water channels to 
be 1 billion Swiss Francs. Along these lines, the maintenance of these production sites and irrigation 
systems has been assigned an insurance value, because this would allow the increase of agricultural 
production if needed [24]. Sustaining the existing community based irrigation systems has thus been 
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perceived as an important task for policy makers and other stakeholders. More specifically, the 
preservation of the existing systems is thus of high importance from a rural, ecological and agricultural 
policy point of view. Instruments to achieve these goals are currently under discussion, including 
financial incentive schemes for preservation of irrigation systems (e.g., [25]) and policy interventions 
preventing losses of such areas [23].  
Based on this background, we aim to analyze potential factors that determine the survival of such 
communities. To this end, we use a survey in an exemplary irrigation community in the canton of 
Valais. This survey is developed based on a review on potential factors provided by game theoretical 
literature, as well as the specific characteristics of the employed case study. The survey results are 
evaluated empirically and qualitatively to identify the most important determinants for the survival of 
the considered irrigation community. These factors are relevant for policy makers and other 
stakeholders to avoid further losses of these unique agricultural systems and to preserve the associated 
benefits by pointing out the promising paths to follow in policy reforms. Thus, our results contribute to 
current policy discussions by revealing alternative approaches for conservation of traditional irrigation 
communities and the associated land use practices in the Swiss Alps. More generally, we additionally 
aim to link the here presented example of sustainable resource and infrastructure management with 
recent developments of incentive schemes in agricultural policy. The here presented analysis aims to 
extend the existing concepts applied to explain the success and failure of irrigation communities in 
Switzerland (e.g., [26,27]). Most importantly, the here presented analysis provides a value added to 
existing studies by empirically testing the success factors.  
2. Game Theoretical Background on Resource Competition 
In this section, we briefly introduce the idea of resource competition from a game theoretical 
perspective. Note that this section cannot provide an in-depth overview on all aspects of game theory, 
but rather aims to provide the basis for hypotheses development for the questionnaire. Thus, we restrict 
our presentation to short descriptions of important aspects and their expected effects on cooperative 
behavior, because deeper descriptions and analyses are beyond the scope of this paper. Even though 
the discussed phenomena may be well known, their brief discussion in this section is important for the 
interpretation of the results derived in our study.  
In general, game theoretical analyses are devoted to strategic interactions, i.e., covering situations 
where the actions of individuals mutually influence their pay-off (or well-being) and, thus, their 
behavior (e.g., [18,28]). Thus, players involved in the ‘game’ interact, and their optimal decisions 
influence each other. The so called prisoner’s dilemma is a widely used example in game theory to 
describe competition on resource provision, maintenance or use. For irrigation systems, this resource 
can be either the water itself (e.g., in case of a reservoir) and/or the irrigation infrastructure (e.g., 
provision or maintenance pumps, pipes or channels). The question addressed in this paper refers to  
the latter case.  
A simple description of the decision matrix for two players is depicted in Table 1. In situation A, 
both players invest in the irrigation infrastructure and have positive returns from this investment. 
However, if one player does not contribute to the infrastructure investment, i.e., is free-riding, his 
return is even higher, because he still benefits from the infrastructure (situation B1 and B2). Thus, both 
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players have an incentive to not cooperate. Anticipating the behavior of the opponent, both players will 
decide not to invest, leading to situation C. This example shows that the strategic interaction of both 
players can result in the Nash equilibrium of non-investment, which actually represents the dilemma: 
even though both players would benefit from cooperation, their strategic interaction leads to a non-optimal 
solution, because no investment takes place.  
Table 1. Schematic formulation of a prisoners’ dilemma on infrastructure investment.  
  Player 2
Player 1 
Strategy Investment No Investment 
Investment 
A: Both players benefit from 
investment and both cover the 
costs
B1: Both players benefit from 
investment, but only Player 1 
covers costs 
No Investment 
B2: Both players benefit from 
investment, but only Player 2 
covers costs
C: No investment takes place, 
neither benefit the players, nor 
have they to cover costs 
Even though the theoretical model described above results in non-cooperation, it has been 
frequently observed in case studies and experiments that cooperation (in our example, the joint 
provision or maintenance of infrastructure) is possible (see, e.g., [4,16] for overviews). Theoretical and 
empirical investigations on game theoretical approaches have provided several arguments as to why 
this cooperative solution is possible. We conducted a literature review to identify the most important of 
those arguments for the case of irrigation infrastructure provision. These phenomena derived from the 
literature are used to develop hypotheses for our survey.  
In the game presented in Table 1, we assumed that players make investment decisions only once. 
However, in practice, players can be involved in the same game (with the same opponents) more than 
once, e.g., infrastructure maintenance decisions are made every year. If the game is repeated a finite 
number of times and the players are aware of this limit, there will be still no incentive to cooperate. 
Using backward induction of the sequential game, one can show that all players have an incentive to 
not invest in the final round, which also eliminates the incentives to cooperate in previous rounds. 
However, if the number of rounds is infinitive or the number of rounds is unknown to the players, 
repetition enables cooperative behavior (e.g., [29,30]). In these cases, i.e., if players play more than 
once against each other, certain behavioral rules of the players can induce cooperative behavior. Thus, 
players have strict or implicit rules (which are known by the other players) on how to react to  
the non-cooperative behavior of others. Players may simply react with the same strategy their opponent 
has chosen (tit-for-tat), i.e., cooperation is followed by cooperation (in response to the other player), 
non-cooperation by non-cooperation. If all players are aware of these decision rules, incentives for 
non-cooperative behavior are reduced, because gains from cheating are small or even negative (they do 
not pay-off in the long run). If players cannot observe other players decisions directly, an indirect 
decision rule may be chosen that focuses on the outcome of the game (e.g., profits, water availability 
for irrigation) observed by the player: if this outcome falls below a certain trigger, he stops 
cooperating, because this shows him that there is non-cooperative behavior in the group (trigger 
strategy). For the case study addressed in this paper, the above described situation may refer to the 
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observation of a lack of water received by a farmer due to (or the direct observation of) insufficient 
infrastructure. These phenomena are summarized, for instance, by Axelrod [31], Axelrod and Dion [32], 
Bendor and Mookherjee [33], Fudenberg and Maskin [34] and Matsushima [35]. In this repetitive 
setting of games, it is important for our application how important future periods are for the involved 
players (i.e., their preferences for future periods). This cooperative solution of the game requires 
players to have preferences for future periods, because, otherwise (if only the current period matters), 
short-term maximization of profits would lead to non-cooperative behavior. 
Along these lines, cooperative group behavior can also be facilitated if players have the option to 
punish others. Even though punishment may not be necessarily rational (because it is costly and does 
not necessarily increases one’s own outcome), it has been observed that human beings usually are 
willing to punish at their own expense. This strategy is particularly efficient if the punishment 
mechanisms are fixed in institutional rules (e.g., an automatic punishment) (e.g., [36–41]). In addition, 
it has been pointed out that the group size (i.e., the number of players) may affect incentives for 
cooperative behavior. In small groups, players know each other and can observe the behavior of the 
other players, which reduces incentives for non-cooperative behavior (e.g., [42,43]). Also, the players’ 
knowledge of the game has been found to influence cooperative behavior. For instance, if the players 
are aware of the social relationships of the game (e.g., the consequences of their decision on other 
individuals), as well as how their “input” to the community is exactly used, they are more likely to 
cooperate (e.g., [44]). In contrast, asymmetries across players have been found to negatively affect the 
likelihood of cooperative behavior: if payoffs from the game are not equal, e.g., due to asymmetries in 
water rights and land, non-cooperative behavior is more likely [44]. Finally, communication between 
the players is mentioned as an important fact to enable cooperation, because it reduces the degree of 
anonymity: more communication between players increases cooperative behavior [43]1.  
3. Traditional Irrigation Systems in the Canton of Valais and the Case Study “Finnen”2 
Though Switzerland usually receives high levels of precipitation and is known as a “water  
castle” [45,46], the inner alpine valley region of the canton of Valais in South-Western Switzerland is 
located in the rain shadows of the Alps and receives only low levels (annual rainfall levels are between 
400 and 700 mm) of precipitation [47]. The scarcity of rainfall, in particular during summer months, 
has induced the construction of complex channel based irrigation systems in the Valais several 
centuries ago, which were first mentioned between the 11th and the 13th century [48–50]. These 
irrigation channels are mainly used to irrigate grasslands and are called Suonen (in German) or Bisse 
(in French). They are mainly fed from glacial (or snow) melt water. Irrigated grasslands in the canton 
of Valais represent the largest share of irrigated surface in Switzerland [51]. In the beginning of the 
20th century, the system had 200 km of main- and 25,000 km of side channels [52].  
                                                 
1 These game theoretical approaches have been used widely to analyze irrigation systems (see, e.g., [4,16] for overviews). 
In our study, this background is used to develop a survey enabling us to capture and empirically assess the determinants 
contributing to the survival of an irrigation community. 
2 The here presented information is derived from the statutes (available upon request) of the irrigation community, as 
well as an interview with the president of the community, Arthur In-Albon.  
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Historically, most of these irrigation systems were managed in cooperatives and have been referred 
to as success-stories of local management [53]. In these cooperatives, the rights to use water (usually 
determined in hours of water outflow from the main channel) are tied with land use rights, which are 
both passed on over generations. Members of these cooperatives elected presidents and guardians, 
which were responsible for compliance with cooperative rules and the control of the infrastructure. The 
maintenance of infrastructure, however, was the responsibility of all members of the cooperative and 
was carried out in spring, i.e., before the irrigation season started. While this traditional system still 
exists in Switzerland, it has currently not sustained in all cases: In some cases, municipalities took the 
organizational responsibility from irrigation communities or the irrigation systems, and the associated 
land-use has mainly been abandoned ([47,48,54,55] provide further overviews on water channels and 
traditional irrigation in the Valais). An inventory of irrigation systems in the Valais is provided  
by Gerber [49].  
The irrigation systems in the Valais have a high value for the society, because they provide 
important cultural, touristic and ecological functions. The traditional irrigation systems and the so-formed 
landscapes are perceived as one of the most beautiful cultural landscapes in Switzerland [56], and 
traditional irrigation systems are a unique characteristic of the Valais region [23]. These water channel 
systems are furthermore perceived as a part of cultural and historical heritage [57]. Based on these 
cultural values, the water channels and traditional forms of irrigation have also a high touristic value 
(e.g., [50]). They are, for instance, used as “waterway hiking trails” [58,59] and attract many tourists. 
They thus constitute an important economic factor in the highly touristic based economy of the Valais. 
Moreover, irrigation over the period of several centuries has created a unique flora and fauna along the 
irrigation channels, which represents a high biodiversity value [25]. For instance, traditional (gravity) 
irrigation with water being diverted from the water channels downhill over the grassland sites leads to 
a mixture of wet and dry spots that is expected to increase the diversity of plant species and birds [56,60]. 
Furthermore, the maintenance of mountain agriculture may be assigned an insurance-like value by 
providing the potential for (more intensive) production for cases when higher food production is 
needed. Therefore, losses of these irrigation systems imply societal welfare reductions due to reduced 
biodiversity and touristic attractiveness. Failures of community based approaches and a stop of 
irrigated grassland cultivation also have some irreversibility properties, because of natural regrowth 
(e.g., by shrubs), and infrastructure is rapidly lost if not maintained. Thus, the costs of re-establishing 
grassland sites (e.g., if there would be a higher need for food production) or a re-construction of water 
channels (e.g., for touristic purposes) can be very high.  
Our analysis focuses on the irrigation community, Finnen, that is located at 1408 m a.s.l. and 
belongs to the municipality Eggerberg in the canton of Valais. Following its statutes, the irrigation 
community is responsible for the infrastructure of irrigation channels starting at the creek 
“Finnenbach” (fed from snow melt water at the Gärsthorn 2927 m a.s.l.), the distribution of water to 
community members, the fair allocation of maintenance costs, the coordination of building activities 
on the community ground and the enforcement of community rights3.  
The community at large (and not the farmer himself) is the owner of the land. However, community 
members have water rights that are tied to land use rights, which are usually passed on over 
                                                 
3 Note that the water catchment itself is managed by the municipality and not by the community.  
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generations, but can also be traded. Community members consist of registered water users, owners of 
buildings at the community ground or free (external) members. Currently, there are in total about 181 
community members, including 129 members that hold water rights. In contrast to the situation in the 
past, none of the community members are professional farmers anymore. This reflects the general 
development of agricultural employment in the Valais, with substantial switches from full-time to  
part-time agriculture in the last century.  
Due to this fact, the here addressed case study may fundamentally differ from the usually applied 
examples on irrigation communities, where the farmers’ livelihood depends directly on irrigation (see  
e.g., [16] for overviews). Even though channel irrigation systems in Switzerland may represent part-time 
(or even hobby) rather than subsistence agriculture, these irrigation systems are of high relevance due 
to their high cultural, touristic and ecological value (cp. also [61] for an example from Greece).  
In the irrigation community, Finnen, community members pay an annual (membership) fee of 10 CHF, 
a water use fee of 0.50 CHF per hour of water use (i.e., hours of water outflow from the main channel) 
and 10 CHF/year per building on the community ground. Once a year, there is a general assembly, 
where the president, secretary and cashier are elected. Moreover, the general assembly elects every two 
years a person (Wasservogt) who organizes the maintenance event of the irrigation community, that is 
called Gemeinwerk4. This Gemeinwerk takes place before the irrigation season starts with participants 
(members of the community). While participation at this infrastructure maintenance event was 
obligatory in former times, the fee system replaced obligatory participation. Currently, participants are 
reimbursed for their participation. Thus, the fees paid by all community members are necessary to 
ensure the maintenance of the irrigation channel system.  
If irrigation and agricultural use would be abandoned, this would lead to a loss of productive 
agricultural land and a loss of the unique countryside. To prevent this, there is a regulation by the 
municipality that parcels have to be irrigated (and used for grassland production). If the owner of the 
water rights is not carrying out the irrigation on his own, it is made by external persons, but at the 
expense of the owner. So, owners of water rights are actually forced to irrigate their land. The current 
practice is, however, that this duty is conducted by others (other farmers from the community) that are 
compensated for their efforts. The traditional form of irrigation is labor-intensive and, thus, expensive. 
Furthermore, the very small structure of parcels increases costs for management and irrigation. 
Zurwerra [23] estimates the costs for this type of irrigation in the Valais to be about 1,440 CHF per 
hectare each year. In order to avoid expenses due to community fees and irrigation itself, owners of 
water rights could give up or sell their water rights (potentially also meaning that they leave the 
community), or even chose to not further contribute to the community by not paying fees anymore.  
The community has a fixed time schedule for the water use (Wasserkehr) that determines the right 
to use water to a specific water user in time slices of 30 minutes5. This plan for water use is made for 
four weeks. It re-starts from the beginning for the next 30 days. Because the creek has only a small 
flow volume, only one person can use the water, and no simultaneous use of water is possible. Thus, 
any attempt to “steal” water by irrigation off the time table will be detected easily. The irrigation 
season usually lasts till July or August, when the creek dries up.  
                                                 
4 In contrast to other irrigation communities in the Valais, there is no person responsible to control the water use.  
5 The water-use plan is available upon request from the authors.  
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4. Questionnaire  
A questionnaire was developed based on the background information on the case study, the 
interview with the community president and, finally, on the game theoretical literature presented 
above. In this section, we describe the questionnaire content, as well as the intentions of and 
hypotheses associated with the included questions6.  
First, the questionnaire was used to collect information on farms’ and farmers’ characteristics. To 
this end, we asked community members to indicate their age, education and income (in five categories 
of monthly earnings), as well as the size of land (in hectares) they have water rights for. We also asked 
if their land is located at one parcel, many parcels that are located next to each other or if they have 
abutting parcels. For the latter response, they had to specify the number of abutting parcels. 
Respondents also indicated if they have inherited or bought their land. Secondly, we elaborated 
irrigation specific details from the respondents. We asked if they irrigate their land on their own or if 
someone else (usually another farmer who is compensated for this) undertakes this task. Respondents 
also had to indicate if irrigation is worth the effort in financial terms (i.e., if it is profitable to irrigate). 
Furthermore, we asked if they would also irrigate without any obligations or if they irrigate their land 
only because it is obligatory.  
The literature review presented above revealed that the valuation of the future is an important 
determinant for cooperation. In particular, cooperation is more likely the more important future periods 
are. Even though the “game” the community members are playing in our example has an infinite time 
horizon, this may not matter at all if the players leave the system in the next period. To get an 
indication of how important future periods are for the community members, we asked if they have 
successors that will inherit the land and water rights. They had to choose from four categories: sure 
yes, probably yes, probably no, sure no. If there is a successor, we expect that these persons care much 
more about future periods than if this would not be the case.  
Another important point derived from the literature was the knowledge on the system and 
knowledge on the consequences of one’s own behavior on other players. In general, a higher state of 
knowledge is expected to facilitate cooperative behavior. Furthermore, the lack of anonymity in the 
group has been indicated as positive for cooperation. To elaborate on the knowledge of the community 
members on the social structure of the game, we asked them if they know for what the fees they pay 
are used (three categories: no, roughly yes, exactly yes). We also asked if they think that not paying 
fees would affect others. If the answer is “yes”, we asked for specific examples in an open question. To 
approximate how well the respondents know the other community members, we asked them how often 
they see other members (in six categories: daily, weekly, monthly, various times per year, once a year, 
never). Moreover, we asked them if they participate at the annual maintenance event of the irrigation 
community (five categories: always, often, sometimes, infrequent, never). 
Additional questions aimed to identify under which conditions the community members would stop 
cooperation, i.e., would stop contributing fees to the community, and the system would break down. 
First, they were asked if they would still make their payments if there would be no further investment 
                                                 
6 The questionnaire (which was conducted in German) underlying our survey conducted in 2009/2010 is available upon 
request from the authors.  
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in infrastructure and the irrigation channels would thus be in bad conditions. Secondly, they were 
asked if they would pay (accept) an additional annual fee—the amount was randomly chosen for each 
survey from the following set of possibilities: 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 60, 80, 100, 200, 300, 600 and 900 
CHF (i.e., for each questionnaire, an amount was assigned randomly).  
Finally, we asked respondents about their reactions to the non-cooperative behavior of others. Thus, 
these questions should show if community members play tit-for-tat (or similar) strategies or use 
punishment mechanisms. In a first step, the respondents were asked to outline (in an open question) 
their reaction (i.e., what they would do) if they knew that someone is not paying his fees. 
Subsequently, they were asked if they would stop paying their own fee if they knew that others do not 
pay. If they indicated that they would stop paying their fees, they were asked to specify if this would 
be the case already if others would not pay a few times, or if this is only the case if others stop paying 
at all over a long time. The questionnaire was sent to all 181 community members (addresses were 
provided by the president of the irrigation community), and we received 39 completed questionnaires. 
This low response rate can be partially explained by the fact that 25 addresses were not valid (i.e., were 
returned) and six incomplete questionnaires were received. Furthermore, no incentive schemes for 
participation or reminders have been used to motivate higher response rates. In absence of the 
possibility for quantitative validation of the representativeness of the respondents, we used a 
qualitative approach by interacting with the community administration, who supported the 
representativeness of the sample.  
5. Analysis 
In order to investigate the relationship between crucial answers to crucial variables and farmers’ 
characteristics, we employ cross tables and Pearson Chi-Square tests (for categorical variables), 
Kendall’s Tau (for ordered variables), as well as logistic regressions (for continuous explanatory 
variables). More specifically, we test for influential factors explaining the farmers’ decision to irrigate 
on their own using variables describing the farmers’ and land characteristics (such as age, education, 
land size), their involvement in the community (contact to other community members, participation at 
maintenance event) and information about if a successor will inherit the land and water rights. The 
same strategy is used to test for the influential factors explaining the respondents’ answers on the 
questions about whether they know for what the fees are being used and if they think that not paying 
fees affects others. Furthermore, we tested if the stated profitability of the irrigation activity is related 
to the size of the land belonging to their water rights.  
In order to estimate the marginal effect of the size of the additional fee suggested on the probability 
of acceptance, we used a logistic regression between the binary answer to the question and the amount 
offered. Because the explanatory variable is highly skewed, we used its logarithm in the regression. In 
order to validate the explanatory power of the estimated logistic regression model, a cross-validation is 
conducted with a randomly selected training data set consisting of 75% of the total observations and a 
validation dataset of the remaining 25% of the total observations. The coefficient estimates derived 
from the training dataset are used to predict answers in the validation dataset. This cross validation 
procedure is repeated 1,000 times, and the average percentage of correct predictions is reported. 
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6. Results 
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of the community members, as well as of their land used. On 
average, the respondents are 64 years old ,and most of them indicated a professional apprenticeship as 
the highest education level. The most frequent indicated income classes are in line with the average 
incomes observed in the canton of Valais [62]. The area cultivated by a single community member is, 
with an average of 1.07 ha, extremely small and ranges from 0.03 to 7 ha. Very small land sizes are 
often the result of a split-up of an inheritance and are observed also in other parts of the Valais [48]. In 
most cases, this land is even divided in abutting parcels: only 29% of all respondents have only a 
single parcel. Those community members that do have abutting parcels (69%), have on average 3.27 
parcels. Thus, parcels and associated water rights for single members are very small and spread over 
the community ground. Land and water rights are usually inherited, as almost 90% of the respondents 
indicated this. The large range of land sizes reveals strong asymmetries between community members 
regarding their assets and the potential gain from participating in the community. However, as fees are 
also based on the size of water rights (and thus land), these asymmetries are outweighed and are not 
expected to influence decisions on cooperation.  
Table 2. Characteristics of community members and irrigation plots.  
Variable Mean Range SD 
Age 64 42–85 10.75 
Education Most frequent answer (20 out of 34): professional 
apprenticeship 
From obligatory school 
degree to university degree 
- 
Income Most frequent answer (13 out of 35): Between 
3,000 and 5,000 CHF per month 
Moreover, 10 out of 35 indicated monthly 
incomes between 5,000 and 7,000 CHF 
From less than 3,000 till 
more than 9,000 CHF per 
month 
- 
Land size 
Allocation of 
Parcels 
1.07 ha 0.03–7 ha 1.46 ha 
29% indicate that their land is only at one parcel    
8% indicated that their parcels are located next to 
each other  
  
63% indicated to have abutting parcels. On 
average, the number of abutting parcels is 3.27  
  
Is land 
inherited or 
bought? 
77% inherited, 10% bought, 10% both, 3% without answer 
Table 3 summarizes the answers to the irrigation behavior of the community members, as well as 
their importance and valuation of future periods. Only the minority (34%) irrigates on their own. For 
the majority of community members, other persons (usually other farmers) at least temporarily 
undertake this task and, thus, are also responsible for the cultivation of this land. We find a significant 
positive relationships (at the 5% level) between the decision to irrigate on their own and the variables: 
contact with other community members, participation at the annual maintenance event and the 
likelihood that a successor inherits the land and water rights (having a successor increases the 
probability to observe that the irrigation task is performed by the farmer itself). Thus, farmers that are 
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more involved in the community and have high likelihoods that the activities will be carried on further 
in their family are more likely to perform irrigation activities and not transfer this task to other farmers. 
In contrast, no significant relationship was found with land and farmers’ characteristics (age, 
education, land size).  
The majority of community members (78%) indicated that the irrigation is not profitable, i.e., the 
additional production does not cover costs and efforts made. However, a significant (at the 10% level) 
difference between the responses of very small farms (smaller than 1 ha) and the larger farms have 
been found: irrigation tends to be rather profitable for members with larger land sizes. The above 
presented results show that the observed cooperative behavior, i.e., staying in the community, is not 
based on financial incentives for the majority of respondents. This is additionally underlined by the 
following observation: Currently, irrigation (and agricultural use) of the plots is obligatory, which has 
been enforced to avoid shrub invasion at the grassland sites. However, this obligation is not the main 
motivation to continue irrigation: 83% of the respondents indicate that they would continue irrigation 
even if it would no longer be compulsory. In summary, neither the financial motivation nor the 
requirement to use and irrigate the plots seems to be the main driver of the cooperative behavior of 
community members.  
The observed cooperative behavior and the strong (non-financial) preference for maintaining the 
community irrigation system may be based on the clear link to future generations: 74% of the 
respondents indicate that there is (for sure or probably) a successor who will continue their activities. 
Passing along water rights and continuing irrigation activities is also reflecting the strong preference 
for the preservation of the ancestors’ heritage.  
Table 3. Analysis of questions on Irrigation behavior and relevance of future periods. 
Question Answers 
Do you irrigate yourself? Yes: 34%, No: 66% 
Does irrigation pay in financial terms? Yes: 22%, No: 78% 
Would you also irrigate if it would not be obligatory? Yes: 83%, No: 17% 
Do you have a successor who will inherit the water rights? 
Yes, for sure: 36% 
Yes, probably: 38% 
No, probably not: 13% 
No, for sure not: 13% 
The results of the questionnaire with respect to the community members’ knowledge on the system, 
as well as the contact frequency among the members are summarized in Table 4. More than 80% of the 
respondents know how and for what their fees are used. As outlined in the literature review, this is an 
absolutely important determinant for cooperation—the value added of their contribution to the 
community is perceived and recognized by the community members. We find that this knowledge is 
significantly (at the 5% level) positively correlated with the contact frequency with other members of 
the community, as well as with the likelihood that a successor will inherit land and water rights. No 
significant relationship was found with other variables, such as land and farmers’ characteristics.  
The response to the question about if they think that non-cooperative behavior would affect others 
is ambiguous: 41% of the respondents indicated that this would have no influence on others, while 
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44% responded the opposite way. Among the latter, in particular the fact that the level of maintenance 
and, thus, also, of infrastructure could not be held on the current level has been highlighted as a 
consequence of non-cooperative behavior. Moreover, they think that other members would have to pay 
for their non-cooperative behavior by facing higher fees. No significant relationship with other 
variables was found for this question. 
Regarding the contact frequency among the members, the majority of members (46%) indicated that 
they see the others various times per year, and 18% see other members even at least once a month. 
Only 21% indicate that they see the other community members never. Thus, the community members 
do know each other well, which is another important reason for cooperative behavior outlined in the 
literature. About half of the respondents participate at the annual maintenance event. Note that the fee 
system replaced obligatory participation. Thus, this participation is voluntary (and reimbursed). In 
summary, the respondents do know for what their fees are used and many of them see the 
consequences of non-cooperative behavior for others (and the community). Moreover, community 
members know each other and see other members rather frequently. This reduces the incentives for 
non-cooperative behavior, even though the community is, with more than 180 members, rather large.  
Table 4. Analysis of questions on knowledge and anonymity.  
Questions Answers 
Do you know how your fees 
are used? 
No: 18% 
Yes, more or less: 46% 
Yes, exactly: 36% 
Do you think that not paying 
fees affect others? 
No answer: 15% 
No: 41% 
Yes: 44% 
Specifications, if indicated 
yes in the last question (most 
frequent answers to open 
question) 
1. Regular maintenance could not be guaranteed any longer 
and infrastructure cannot not be maintained (7 counts) 
2. Fees for others have to be increased (4 counts) 
3. Maintenance has to be done by myself (2 counts) 
How often do you see other 
community members? 
Daily: 0% 
Once a week: 10% 
Once a month: 8% 
Various times per year: 46% 
Once per year: 15% 
Never: 21% 
Do you participate at the 
annual maintenance event? 
Always: 21% 
Often: 8% 
Sometimes: 10%  
Infrequent: 5% 
Never: 56% 
The strong preference for cooperation is also underlined by the answers summarized in Table 5. 
56% of the respondents would even continue with their payments to the community of the 
infrastructure (what they actually pay for) even if it would be in bad condition. In an open question 
about how they would react if they would know that other members would not pay their fees, most 
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respondents indicated no change in their behavior, but also no personal approach to the dissenter. In 
contrast, they are convinced that the community and its rules will solve the problem. Consequently, 
complaints at the general assembly or to the president are mentioned as possible reactions. Note that, 
however, doing nothing was the most frequent response given by the respondents. Only two persons 
indicated reacting with a tit-for-tat strategy of not paying fees as well. This is also underlined by the 
answers given to the subsequent question: even if they would know that other members would not pay 
their fees, the majority (62%) would not stop paying fees to the community. Among those that would 
consider stopping their payments, 60% would require a frequent non-cooperative behavior of others to 
stop paying fees. Thus, neither tit-for-tat decision rules are considered by the community members, nor 
do they indicate direct punishment mechanisms against non-cooperative behavior. In contrast, the 
community organization itself and the general assembly seem to be the institutions the community 
members rely on, even though no sanctioning mechanisms are defined in the community rules.  
Table 5. Analysis of questions on cooperative behavior. 
Questions Answers 
Would you still pay your fees if 
infrastructure would be in bad 
conditions? 
Yes: 56% 
No: 44% 
What would you do if you know 
that someone is not paying his 
fees? (most frequent answers to 
open question) 
1. No reaction (and still fully comply with my obligations) (9 counts) 
2. Make a complaint (to the president or general assembly), because 
the community is responsible to handle such cases (6 counts) 
3. Stop my paying my fees as well (2 counts) 
If you would know that 
someone is not paying his fees, 
would you still pay your fees? 
Yes: 62% 
No: 38% (among those 40% even if it happens a few time, 60% only if 
it happens frequently) 
Table 6 presents the estimation results of the logistic regression on the respondents’ willingness to 
accept a higher annual fee. In the questionnaire, they were asked if they would accept a certain higher 
annual fee, which was chosen randomly from a set of possible amounts ranging from 5 to 900 CHF. A 
logistic regression was used to estimate the marginal effects of higher fees on the participation in the 
community by paying fees. It shows that, as expected, higher fees reduce the respondents’ willingness 
to accept additional fees.  
Table 6. Coefficient estimates on the willingness to accept additional fees.  
Variable Coefficient estimate (t-value) 
Intercept 1.95 (1.25) 
Logarithm (Additional Fee) −0.51 (−1.81) * 
Correct Predictions 67% 
* denotes significance at the 5% level. 
This marginal effect of the size of the additional fee on the probability of acceptance is visualized in 
Figure 1. It shows that one part of the community is sensitive to increasing fees, i.e., willingness to 
accept additional fees reduces rapidly with increases from the current level. However, the marginal 
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effects curve shows saturation for higher amount of fees, which indicates the insensitivity of another 
part of the community to higher fees.  
Figure 1. Marginal effect of the size of the additional fee on the probability of acceptance. 
 
7. Summary and Policy Conclusions 
We analyzed a community based irrigation system in the Valais, Switzerland. This case study 
represents an example of how community based management of water and infrastructure can sustain 
over centuries. Revealing the factors that lead to continuation can thus provide important insights for 
policy makers and other stakeholders on how community based management of common pool 
resources can be sustained also in the future. Traditional channel based irrigation systems in the Valais 
are of high cultural, touristic and ecological value. However, many of these systems have been 
abandoned in the last century. These abandonments represent a societal welfare loss and are also 
characterized by irreversibility, because unmanaged land and irrigation channels may be lost rapidly 
due to natural regrowth. We analyzed potential factors contributing to continuation of the community 
using a questionnaire distributed among the community members, which was returned by 39 
respondents. The questionnaire development was based on a literature review on factors that can 
support cooperative behavior, with a particular focus on observations derived from game theory. Our 
empirical investigation was thus used to identify and isolate those factors that are responsible for 
cooperative behavior.  
We find that the motivation of community members in the here analyzed example to remain in the 
community based management of irrigation channels is not a financial one. None of them is a full-time 
farmer, and most of the respondents indicated that irrigation and the associated grassland production is 
not profitable for them, i.e., costs for coordination and infrastructure maintenance are not covered by 
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the additional returns from agricultural production. Currently, irrigation (and cultivation) of parcels is 
obligatory though a regulation of the municipality. 83% of respondents indicated that they would 
continue current management even if there would be no such regulation. This is additionally 
underlined by the fact that most respondents would continue to pay their fees even if the infrastructure 
would be in bad conditions. Also, an analysis of their willingness to accept higher levels of fees 
revealed a saturated response, i.e., a price insensitivity for some of the community members. Thus, 
neither financial motives nor legislative regulation seem to be the major motivation for continuing the 
community based management and use of water from irrigation channels. In contrast, other factors are 
much more important.  
For instance, the tradition of passing on land use and water rights from generation to generation 
seems to be one of the factors contributing to the continuation of the community. The majority of 
respondents has inherited their water and land-use rights and already has a successor that will continue 
their activities. Therefore, community members have strong preferences for the future and do not 
follow short-run maximization of profits (or better cost-avoiding) by leaving the community, by selling 
their water rights or by stopping the payment of fees. Due to this high relevance of future periods, the 
repetitive nature of the decision on infrastructure maintenance enables cooperative behavior. 
Furthermore, the good knowledge on the system at large, as well as the lack of anonymity and 
communication between players have been found to be important drivers for the continuation of the 
analyzed irrigation community. Almost all respondents know for what (and how) their financial 
contributions to the community are used and that not paying fees has consequences for other members. 
Even though the group of involved actors is large (the community has more than 180 members), they 
indicate frequent contact and communication among community members, which is expected to reduce 
the anonymity factor within the group. Other success factors frequently mentioned in the literature are 
related to reactions of players to non-cooperative behavior. It is assumed that, for example, tit-for-tat 
strategies, i.e., answering with non-cooperative behavior on observed deviations from cooperative 
behavior, would enable cooperation. In general, also, the strong will of players to use (or even 
institutional agreements on) punishment options was expected to enforce cooperative behavior in the 
group. However, our questionnaire revealed that community members do not use these strategies: most 
of them would continue to pay their fees even if they know that others do not. Most respondents 
indicated that they would not react at all or, if reacting, would make a complaint to the community 
president or at the general assembly. No kind of punishment was mentioned. Thus, instead of 
responding to non-cooperative behavior on their own, members tend to rely on the institution of the 
community to handle non-cooperative behavior, even though no sanctioning mechanisms are explicitly 
defined in the community rules. To further investigate determinants of community behavior in these 
traditional irrigation systems, future research should focus on investigating (and comparing) a wider 
set of communities, build-up panel information (to trace the development of communities over time) 
and also focus on additional qualitative information (e.g., by using interviews instead of surveys). 
For policy makers, our results show that financial incentive schemes may have a limited potential to 
solve problems of these irrigation systems, i.e., to stop their disappearance. This is due to the fact that 
participants’ decisions seem to be not mainly driven by financial motivations. Rather, the institution of 
the community, the frequent contact (and exchange), as well as the good knowledge on the system are 
the determinants of a successful community based management of irrigation infrastructure. An 
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introduction of financial motivations to sustain the traditional irrigation systems may even have the 
contrary effect: if financial aspects are emphasized by the government, this may change the perception 
of community members and may push the actual motivations into the background. More generally, 
Swiss agricultural policy is focused to compensate farmers for reducing environmental loads from 
agriculture and to provide public goods, related to recent discussions on payments for ecosystem 
services (see, e.g., [63]). This is even more emphasized in the currently discussed reform of the Swiss 
agricultural policy [64]. Lessons learned from the here presented example show that the creation of 
institutions that enable a self-governance and communication, as well as knowledge transfers (e.g., on 
specific environmental problems) may be another path that should be followed in the future. This 
conclusion may be also valid for choosing adequate institutional and policy designs for agricultural 
water use in a more general sense that will be critically important to ensure sustainable water resource 
use and sufficient food production.  
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